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COMMENT
How America’s Newest Consumer Credit Statute Fails to
Protect Its Oldest Consumers: A Critique of the Credit
CARD Act of 2009*

I. Introduction
Facing off against a number of credit card industry executives before the
United States Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs
on January 25, 2007, Harvard Law Professor and consumer advocate
Elizabeth Warren1 made her position unmistakably clear: “The credit card
market is broken.”2 Professor Warren’s comprehensive testimony included
sharp criticism of credit card marketing practices which target the elderly,
who “have the dark distinction of being the fastest growing age group filing
for bankruptcy.”3 She concluded by urging the Senate to enact Senator
Christopher Dodd’s Credit Card Accountability Responsibility and
Disclosure (Credit CARD) Act as “an important first step to reign in
abusive lending practices.”4 In so doing, Professor Warren lent her voice to
a growing chorus of legal commentators arguing in favor of enhanced
statutory protections for elderly credit card consumers.5
* The author wishes to thank Professor Brian McCall for his helpful comments and
advice. This comment is dedicated to my wife, Carmen, whose patience and
encouragement was an essential part of the writing process. This comment is also dedicated
to Catheryn Koss and Jill Watskey of the Senior Law Resource Center in Oklahoma
City. Their generous support of my interest in legal issues facing the elderly is deeply
appreciated.
1. President Obama later appointed Elizabeth Warren, a native of Oklahoma, as Assistant
to the President and Special Advisor to the Secretary of the Treasury to assist in launching the
newly created Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, a Department of Treasury agency which
will implement the Credit CARD Act of 2009 and other consumer financial protection statutes.
See Meet Elizabeth Warren, CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION BUREAU, http://www.consumer
finance.gov/the-bureau/meet-Elizabeth-Warren (last visited Feb. 13, 2011).
2. Examining the Billing, Marketing, and Disclosure Practices of the Credit Card
Industry, & Their Impact on Consumers: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous. &
Urban Affairs, 110th Cong. 1-2 (2007) [hereinafter Warren Testimony] (statement of Elizabeth
Warren, Leo Gottlieb Professor of Law, Harvard Law School).
3. Id. at 6.
4. Id. at 7.
5. See, e.g., Donna S. Harkness, When Over-the-Limit Is Over the Top: Addressing the
Adverse Impact of Unconscionable Consumer-Credit Practices on the Elderly, 16 ELDER L.J.
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Following “a long process of negotiations between consumer groups,
credit card companies, elected officials, regulators, and other interested
parties,” Congress enacted the Credit CARD Act in 2009.6 Although the
Credit CARD Act was signed by President Obama on May 22, 2009, the
final regulations promulgated pursuant to the Act were not effective until
August 2010.7 In addition, the new Consumer Financial Protection Bureau,
which will enforce the provisions of the Credit Card Act, was not fully
operational until summer 2011.8 As a result, the Credit CARD Act’s effects
are only beginning to be felt. Nevertheless, some elder consumer credit
reform advocates already accord it high praise.9 Others are more cautious,
stressing that the Act is “not a panacea,” but expressing hope that it “does
provide welcome relief as it portends a new, more consumer oriented
direction for the credit card industry.”10
In the years leading up to the passage of the Credit CARD Act, consumer
credit reform advocates presented increasingly persuasive and alarming
evidence that the elderly represent a uniquely vulnerable class of credit card
consumers who face constant bombardment from a greedy industry focused
almost exclusively on profit-maximization.11 To the extent that this
assessment is accurate, it is worth examining whether the Credit CARD Act
sufficiently protects elderly credit card consumers from predatory lending.
1, 22 (2008) (arguing that existing consumer credit protections “should again be revised to add
substantive protections to address the abuses currently rampant in the area of open-ended
credit”); Deanne Loonin & Elizabeth Renuart, The Life and Debt Cycle: The Growing Debt
Burdens of Older Consumers and Related Policy Recommendations, 44 HARV. J. ON LEGIS.
167, 190-93 (2007) (presenting “seven principles” that purport to provide guidance to
legislators when drafting consumer credit reform statutes for the elderly).
6. Stanton Koppel, Nicole Ibbotson, & Helen Y. Lee, Credit CARD Act of 2009:
Implementation Guidelines, 63 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 205, 206 (2009).
7. Donna S. Harkness, The Credit CARD Act of 2009: Welcome Relief or Too Little, Too
Late for Vulnerable Seniors?, BANKING & FIN. SERVICES POL’Y REP., Sept. 2010, at 12, 12.
8. See Learn About the Bureau, CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION BUREAU, http://www.
consumerfinance.gov/the-bureau (last visited Feb. 13, 2011).
9. See Harkness, supra note 7, at 12 (noting enthusiastic AARP approval of the Credit
CARD Act).
10. Id. at 20 (expressing the author’s own view).
11. See, e.g., HEATHER C. MCGHEE & TAMARA DRAUT, DĒMOS, RETIRING IN THE RED:
THE GROWTH OF DEBT AMONG OLDER AMERICANS 1-7 (2004), available at http://archive.
demos.org/pubs/retiring_2ed.pdf; Loonin & Renuart, supra note 5, at 168-89; Nathalie Martin,
Consumer Scams and the Elderly: Preserving Independence Through Shifting Default Rules,
17 ELDER L.J. 1, 1-4 (2009); Jeffrey Kimball Paulsen, Note, Credit Card Disclosures and the
Elderly: Will the Proposed Amendments to Regulation Z Help the Elderly Understand Credit
Card Documents?, 17 ELDER L.J. 125, 126-34 (2009).
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Unfortunately, it does not. While the Credit CARD Act is a step in the
right direction, it ultimately fails to provide adequate consumer protection
to elderly credit card consumers and may actually do more harm than good.
Thus, the passage of the Credit CARD Act will not end the victimization of
elderly credit card users by unscrupulous lenders. To the contrary, elderly
credit card consumers will not have the substantive statutory protections
they deserve until Congress enacts an elder-specific consumer credit
protection statute.
Part II of this comment reviews and reaffirms the position of consumer
credit reform advocates regarding the vulnerabilities of elderly credit card
consumers, the predatory lending practices prevalent in the credit card
industry, and the nexus between the two. Part III traces the historical
legislative and regulatory response to abusive lending practices. Part IV
summarizes the substantive protections that the Credit CARD Act provides.
Part V explains why these provisions, while helpful to a limited extent,
ultimately fail to protect elderly credit card consumers and may actually
harm them. Part VI proposes substantive statutory consumer protections
for elderly credit card consumers and also offers some suggestions for
obtaining the best protection for elderly credit card consumers under
existing law.
II. Credit Cards and the Elderly: A Tale of Use and Abuse
Credit card use among the elderly is on the rise in the United States.12
Approximately 75% of the elderly are credit card consumers.13 The
average amount of credit card debt for elderly consumers represents about
20% of the average income for the elderly.14 The elderly experienced the
largest growth in credit card debt of any age group in the years between
1989 and 2004.15 These troubling statistics prompt a number of questions.
What unique factors are causing elderly had credit card consumers to
acquire ever-increasing amounts of credit card debt? How is the credit card
12. See Loonin & Renuart, supra note 5, at 168 (“Average credit card debt for Americans
between the ages of sixty-five and sixty-nine rose a staggering 217% between 1992 and 2001,
to $5,844.”).
13. See MCGHEE & DRAUT, supra note 11, at 2.
14. See Paulsen, supra note 11, at 128 (citing statistics that indicate that in 2001, credit
card consumers over the age of sixty-five had an average credit card indebtedness of $4041 and
an average annual income of $18,938 (21% ratio) and that credit card consumers aged 65-69
had an average credit card indebtedness of $5844 and an average annual income of $26,796
(22% ratio)).
15. Id.

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2012

174

OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 64:171

industry persuading elderly credit card consumers to take on more debt? In
the end, has the net result of increased credit card use by the elderly had
positive or negative effects on society?
The personal experience of each elderly credit card consumer is surely
unique. Nonetheless, an examination of several factors and trends unique
to elderly credit card consumers the helps to illuminate the problematic
relationship between this segment of the population and the credit card
industry.16
A. A Portrait of an Elderly Credit Card Consumer
Today’s elderly credit card consumer is retired or nearing retirement.17
As such, he or she confronts a number of difficult economic challenges. An
increasing number of elderly persons rely on Social Security as their sole
source of retirement income.18 The recent economic downturn has made an
already difficult situation even worse as the value of retirement investments
continues to decline.19 Meanwhile, housing costs (including property
taxes), medical expenses, and energy prices continue to rise.20 In short,
today’s elderly person faces “declining income and wealth coupled with
rising costs.”21 One possible bright spot in an otherwise bleak financial
picture is home ownership: “Many older Americans . . . have a great deal
16. The argument no doubt will be made that the Credit CARD Act significantly
ameliorates many of the problems inherent in elderly credit card use that are depicted in this
section. Nonetheless, an accurate presentation of the status quo in the years directly preceding
the passage of the Credit CARD Act provides an essential starting point for an analysis of its
likely effectiveness. Unfortunately, the Credit CARD Act is demonstrably ineffective at
solving the myriad problems surrounding credit card use by the elderly.
17. Defining “elderly” with respect to a specific age is a complex matter. Nonetheless, the
simple fact of Social Security eligibility age brackets causes most older Americans to make the
shift from full-time employment to retirement sometime during their sixties. See SSA Federal
Old-Age, Survivors & Disability Insurance, 20 C.F.R. § 404.409 (2010) (“Full retirement age
has been 65 but is being gradually raised to age 67 beginning with people born after January 1,
1938.”). Given that retirement tends to be the most significant factor of economic change in
the lives of most older Americans, it functions as a useful proxy for drawing a precise line
between “elderly” and “non-elderly.” Indeed, credit card use appears to spike significantly
after the age of sixty-five. See Paulsen, supra note 11, at 128 (citing statistics that indicate that
in 2001-2002, the average credit card indebtedness of individuals aged 55-64 was $4088, while
the average credit card indebtedness of individuals aged 65-69 was $5844, a difference of
$1756).
18. See Loonin & Renuart, supra note 5, at 170-71.
19. See Harkness, supra note 7, at 12 (noting that “senior citizens . . . have found
themselves increasingly strapped for cash during the current economic downturn”).
20. Loonin & Renuart, supra note 5, at 171-73.
21. Paulsen, supra note 11, at 129.
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of equity in their homes, but not much else.”22 Thus, the home has become
the “primary asset of many retirees.”23 Home equity is an illiquid asset,
however, with no immediate financial use to an elderly person except as
collateral for a mortgage or other type of debt.24
Elderly credit card consumers frequently face physical and mental
challenges which render them more vulnerable than the general population
to various forms of financial abuse.25 Indeed, “vulnerability to abuse can be
due to cognitive impairment, physical impairments, sensory impairments,
or socioemotional vulnerabilities” or any combination of these.26
Physically, elderly persons often spend a majority of their time at home due
to lack of mobility, rending them vulnerable to aggressive and enticing
sales pitches via phone, mail, and direct solicitation.27 Meanwhile,
neurological research indicates that “older people have difficulty in
processing new information” and “retain less detail about the information
they do process . . . .”28
Socio-culturally, the elderly credit card consumer tends to have “oldfashioned” values that may conflict with modern-day business practices:
[T]he generation that is currently aged sixty-five to eighty-four
was either born or came of age during World War II. This
generation is known for individuals that are both trusting and
trustworthy; they value promises and consider one’s word to be

22. Martin, supra note 11, at 20.
23. Id. at 21 (praising California for providing a greater homestead exemption to “people
over age sixty-five”).
24. See id. at 22-25 (suggesting that a reverse mortgage can be a useful solution for an
elderly person seeking to “discharge a great deal of debt”). The reverse mortgage should
probably best be regarded as an extreme option of last resort due to its high long-term costs and
consequences, including its limited usefulness (it can only be used once) and the negative
effects it has on inheritance. See id. at 24. Attorneys and their clients should approach the
reverse mortgage option with caution. But see Celeste M. Hammond, Reverse Mortgages: A
Financial Planning Device for the Elderly, 1 ELDER L.J. 75, 76-77 (1993) (arguing that reverse
mortgages are a desirable tool that should be widely used).
25. Shelby A.D. Moore & Jeanette Schaefer, Remembering the Forgotten Ones:
Protecting the Elderly from Financial Abuse, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 505, 517-20 (2004)
(noting that “senior citizens living independently . . . are especially vulnerable to financial
abuse”).
26. Id. at 518.
27. See id. at 518 n.50 (referencing Senator Tom Daschle’s statement, and noting that “the
elderly are frequently targeted by criminals because they lack mobility, they are isolated, and
they are dependent on others”).
28. Harkness, supra note 5, at 19.
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one’s bond. . . . [T]his generation tends to be loath to leave any
obligation they have incurred unmet.29
In addition, elderly credit card consumers are frequently lonely and as a
result are more willing to let their guard down—approaching interpersonal
interactions with less healthy suspicion than they might once have done.30
Educationally, elderly persons are overall less literate than other age
groups: in a 2003 study “adults ages 65 and older had the lowest average
prose, document, and quantitative literacy.”31 Prose literacy involves “[t]he
knowledge and skills needed to search, comprehend, and use information
from continuous texts,” such as a newspaper article.32 Document literacy
involves the same ability with respect to non-continuous texts, such as a
schedule.33 Quantitative literacy involves “[t]he knowledge and skills
needed to identify and perform computations using numbers that are
embedded in printed materials,” such as a credit card statement.34 While
the percentage of elderly persons aged sixty-five and older who had “Below
Basic” literacy declined from 33% in 1992 to 23% in 2003, elderly persons
still had almost double the rate of “Below Basic” literacy compared to any
other age group.35
B. Offers of Credit and Acceptance by the Elderly
Credit card companies aggressively target offers of credit to individuals
of all ages, including over six billion “pre-approved” credit offers alone.36
This seemingly equal-opportunity marketing strategy obscures the credit
card industry’s “two-tier business model,” under which credit card
companies categorize their customers in terms of regular payers and nonregular payers.37 Regarding the first tier:
For each of these [regularly-paying] customers, the card issuer
can count on a stream of revenue—money from the merchants
each time the customer used the credit card [known as
interchange fees], annual fees from some of the customers, and a
29. Id. at 3-4.
30. See Martin, supra note 11, at 4-5.
31. U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., LITERACY IN EVERYDAY LIFE:
NATIONAL ASSESSMENT OF ADULT LITERACY 27 (2003).
32. Id. at iii.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 28.
36. Warren Testimony, supra note 2, at 3.
37. Id.
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chance to sell enhancements, such as credit insurance and tax
preparation assistance. It is a profitable business.38
Indeed, in 2005, interchange fees, annual fees, and enhancements
generated a total of nearly $25 billion in revenue for credit card
companies.39
But the latter category of “second tier” customers is even more valuable.
In addition to contributing their share of the $25 billion of “first tier”
revenues:
[T]he customers who generate the real profits for the credit card
companies are those who stumble and slide, who make payments
and miss payments, and who end up paying default rates of
interest and penalty fees. To maximize profits from this group,
the credit card issuers have a second tier to their business model:
they load their initial card agreements with tricks and traps so
that they can maximize income from interest rates and fees.40
Again, in 2005, interest rates and penalty fees generated nearly $80
billion in revenue for credit card companies.41 In other words, “[n]early
eight out of every ten dollars of revenue comes from the customers who
cannot pay off their bills in full every month.”42
A typical offer of credit contains one or more “bait and switch” terms
and conditions, such as “teaser rates” and “deferred interest.”43 Prior to the
passage of the Credit CARD Act, terms and conditions like these were fully
legal, no matter how “egregiously unfair,” as long as required pre-lending
disclosures had been made.44 Shifting interest rates and surprise fees
associated with carefully-crafted credit cards enable credit card companies
to market offers which simultaneously entice and baffle consumers.45
Sadly, “[a]fter experiencing the tricks and traps of these forms of credit,

38. Id.
39. See id. at 2.
40. Id. at 2-3.
41. See id. at 2.
42. Id. Only time will tell what effect, if any, the Credit CARD Act will have on this ratio.
43. Martin, supra note 11, at 12.
44. Harkness, supra note 5, at 9. Note that the Credit CARD Act has limited, but has not
eliminated, these practices.
45. See Martin, supra note 11, at 8-11 (citing behavioral research that suggests that
optimism regarding ability to pay is widespread among financial consumers and creates
vulnerability to highly-enticing offers).
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younger individuals have time to get back on their feet, but the elderly have
no such luxury.”46
Credit card companies are well aware of the unique vulnerabilities of
various classes of credit card users, including elderly credit card users. For
example, one Bank of America executive admitted that “last year the bank
had conducted more than 500 experiments and sent out 111 million pieces
of mail to test consumer behavior with credit cards.”47 Unfortunately for
the elderly consumer, “[t]here is a darker side to these data than mere profit
maximization. Creditors are well aware of the numerous errors of cognition
committed by consumers and capitalize on the errors in order to increase
bottom lines.”48
No great inferential leap is required to perceive a nexus between (1) the
unique financial, physical, mental, and cultural vulnerabilities of the
elderly, (2) hyper-aggressive credit card lending practices, and (3) increased
credit card debt by the elderly:
[T]he world of marketing, advertising, and financial product
design is changing so rapidly that it is hard for anyone to keep
up. For the elderly, the fastest growing demographic in
America, it is particularly difficult to cope. Many of the
products being offered to consumers today simply were not
available a decade ago, when many older clients were full
participants in the economy.49
Thus, it is little wonder that the elderly credit card consumer, squeezed
by financial need on the one hand and enticed by the false promise of easy
and low-cost credit on the other, turns to credit card use without full
awareness of the potential consequences.
C. Results of Credit Card Use by the Elderly
Credit card use by the elderly does not have to be harmful. Indeed,
credit card use can prove beneficial for the elderly, but only to a limited
extent. Credit cards can provide needed liquidity for an elderly individual
on a fixed income because that person can use the card when everyday
purchases need to be made or bills need to be paid and then pay off the
card’s monthly balance when Social Security and other funds become
available. Credit cards can also function as a helpful “safety net” for
46.
47.
48.
49.

Id. at 9.
Id. at 11 (referencing remarks by Elizabeth Warren).
Id. at 12.
Id. at 2.
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emergency purchases such as minor medical expenses or home and
automobile repairs.50 Of course, should an elderly person use their credit
card for the former purpose, then the “safety net” potential of that card is
reduced, increasing the temptation to take out yet another credit card for
“emergencies.”
Unfortunately, credit card use by the elderly can easily result in
astronomically mounting debt with little or no ability to pay it down. For
example, the Ohio case of Discover Bank v. Owens involved an elderly
consumer who charged less than $2000 on her credit card and yet was sued
for $5564.28 of debt, in spite of having made payments totaling $3492 over
the course of six years.51 While cases such as this are admittedly anecdotal,
the mathematical nature of interest charges and fees strongly implies that
elderly persons in similar situations are certain to face similar results.52
Living on a fixed income only exacerbates the problem of mounting finance
charges because payment due dates may not coincide with benefit
payments, thus causing the elderly credit card consumer to fall further
behind.53
Credit card debt can have negative consequences for anyone, but the
consequences for elderly credit card consumers are often severe.
Indebtedness can have immediate consequences to an elderly person
because of creditor garnishment laws, which permit creditors to garnish the

50. See Paulsen, supra note 11, at 129. But see Harkness, supra note 5, at 20-21
(acknowledging the “safety net” potential of credit cards, but arguing that going into debt at a
time of emergency is ultimately a harmful choice).
51. 822 N.E.2d 869, 872 (Cleveland Mun. Ct. 2004). Ms. Owens, who represented herself
pro se, received a judgment in her favor after the judge held that Discover Bank’s actions had
been “unreasonable, unconscionable, and unjust.” Id. at 875.
52. See Warren Testimony, supra note 2, at 5-6 (referencing several more cases with
similar facts). But see Harkness, supra note 7, at 18-20 (arguing that under the Credit CARD
Act, elderly credit card consumers in similar situations might endure less severe consequences,
but admitting that they would suffer significant consequences nonetheless).
53. See Discover Bank, 822 N.E.2d at 871-72. Ms. Owens’s answer to Discover Bank’s
complaint stated the following:
I would like to inform you that I have no money to make payments. I am on
Social Security Disability. After paying my monthly utilities, there is no money
left . . . and sometimes it isn’t enough. If my situation was different I would pay.
I just don’t have it. I’m sorry.
Id. at 871. Recall that Ms. Owens had already tendered $3492 in payments; however, “[s]ince
many of the payments were below the minimum monthly payment required and because other
monthly payments were in fact not timely made, Owens further was assessed numerous latepayment fees, which over the six-year period totaled $1,160.” Id. at 872.
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bank accounts of debtors.54 Although Social Security and certain other
exempt funds cannot be lawfully garnished, banks frequently freeze
accounts containing these funds when presented with a garnishment order
because of the difficulty of distinguishing between exempt and non-exempt
funds.55 The impact that this practice has on elderly persons living on fixed
incomes is easy to imagine: “Social Security recipients whose bank
accounts are frozen often experience major difficulties during the weeks or
even months it may take to prove their funds are exempt and regain access
to the federal benefits they rely upon for subsistence.”56
Unfortunately, bankruptcy is increasingly becoming the only way out for
elderly persons struggling with credit cards and other forms of debt. In
2001, Americans aged sixty-five and older increased their bankruptcy
filings by 213%, “the largest rate growth within any age group.”57 And in
2008, a follow-up study showed that “a much larger fraction of the people
filing for bankruptcy in 2007 were retirement age or older than in 1991.”58
Even worse, “since 1991, the bankruptcy risk for older Americans has
increased substantially.”59 While credit card debt is certainly not the only
cause of increased bankruptcy filings, its prevalence among the elderly is
certainly a contributing factor.
III. Legislative and Regulatory Responses to Abusive Lending Practices
No federal consumer credit protection statutes or regulations provide
explicit provisions targeting the specific needs of elderly credit card users.
Prior to the passage of the Credit CARD Act, federal regulation of credit
54. Paula Burkes, New Rules May Guard Seniors’ Benefits, DAILY OKLAHOMAN, Aug. 15,
2010, at 1C.
55. See John Infranca, Safer than the Mattress? Protecting Social Security Benefits from
Bank Freezes and Garnishments, 83 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1127, 1129 (2010). Banks “risk
incurring liability for the full amount” of a garnishment order if they refuse to garnish nonexempt funds. Burkes, supra note 54, at 6C. Thus, “[w]hen funds from more than one source
[including Social Security] are combined in one account, it is impossible for a bank to know
what funds . . . are exempt from being garnished” and banks invariably err on the side of
caution and freeze the entire account. Id.
56. Infranca, supra note 55, at 1130.
57. Teresa A. Sullivan, Deborah Thorne, & Elizabeth Warren, Young, Old, and In
Between: Who Files for Bankruptcy?, NORTON BANKR. L. ADVISER, Sept. 2001, at 1, 2 (issue
no. 9A).
58. Teresa Sullivan, Deborah Thorne, & Elizabeth Warren, Bankruptcy Ages, NORTON
BANKR. L. ADVISER, Nov. 2008, at 1, 3 (issue no 11).
59. Id. at 4. The authors concluded that “the economic news for seniors is unambiguously
grim.” Id.

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol64/iss2/4

2012]

COMMENT

181

card lending practices consisted of the Truth-In-Lending Act of 1968
(TILA)60 and the Federal Reserve Board of Governors’ Regulation Z, which
implemented TILA’s provisions.61 Neither of these contained any agespecific regulations. However, a brief historical analysis is helpful in
understanding the foundation on which the Credit CARD Act rests and in
providing a starting point for new reform proposals.
It is important to note that federal law preempts state law in this area for
essentially all purposes because of two Supreme Court decisions which
almost entirely stripped states of the ability to regulate the lending
industry.62 In Marquette National Bank of Minneapolis v. First of Omaha
Service Corp., the Court held that “[s]ection 85 [of the National Bank
Act] . . . plainly provides that a national bank may charge interest ‘on any
loan’ at the rate allowed by the laws of the State in which the bank is
‘located.’”63
This holding, labeled by some commentators as the
“exportation doctrine,”64 had the effect of “set[ting] off two races: first for
credit card lenders to move their operations to states with no interest rate
caps, and second for legislatures to remove their usury laws in order to
attract or hold onto rapidly expanding credit card companies.”65 Later, in
Smiley v. Citibank (South Dakota), N.A., the Court upheld the Comptroller
of the Currency’s decision to define “interest” to include penalty fees, thus
curtailing states’ abilities to regulate fees as well.66 Having thereby limited

60. Pub. L. No. 90-321, 82 Stat. 146 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1667(e) (West,
Westlaw through 2011)).
61. 12 C.F.R. § 226 (2010).
62. While the Supreme Court decisions presented here render it nearly impossible for
states to impose direct regulations on lending institutions which are not located within their
borders, oversight of abusive lending practices is still possible to a limited extent through
application of traditional contract doctrines such as unconscionability. See, e.g., Discover Bank
v. Owens, 822 N.E.2d 869, 875 (Cleveland Mun. Ct. 2004); Harkness, supra note 5, at 14-15
(cautioning that “the unconscionability doctrine tends to be reserved for the harshest and
severest terms and cannot be relied upon to protect vulnerable consumers who are victimized to
a lesser extent”); see also infra Part VI.C.
63. 439 U.S. 299, 308 (1978).
64. Loonin & Renuart, supra note 5, at 174 (defining the “exportation doctrine” as a rule
allowing “banks to locate in a state with no usury caps and few consumer protections and make
loans to borrowers beyond its borders under the legal regime of the home state . . . thus,
effectively federaliz[ing] the absence of usury protections in the few states . . . that were willing
to completely deregulate”).
65. Christopher L. Peterson, Truth, Understanding, and High-Cost Consumer Credit: The
Historical Context of the Truth in Lending Act, 55 FLA. L. REV. 807, 873 (2003).
66. 517 U.S. 735, 740-47 (1996).

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2012

182

OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 64:171

most aspects of lending regulation, the Court left states that do not host
major banks with few tools to regulate consumer credit.
A. The Truth-in-Lending Act of 1968
By 1968, Congress had grown concerned that consumers were not
adequately informed regarding the range of terms and conditions being
offered by lenders, including credit card companies.67 Lenders were
exploiting this weakness by using confusing offers of credit to trap unwary
consumers under unmanageable amounts of debt.68 After eight years of
debate, the Senate Banking Committee approved the Truth-in-Lending Act,
which was quickly passed by the Senate and the House.69 TILA mandated
the “disclosure of the cost of credit based on standard uniform requirements
set out by the act and by the Federal Reserve Board.”70 By design, TILA
regulated much in the way of disclosure, but little in the way of substance.71
TILA, as initially enacted, quickly became the subject of criticism.72
After a mere twelve years, its disclosure requirements had engendered a
complex body of regulatory law which required nearly “1500 advisory
opinions interpreting what the rules meant.”73 Complaints came from the
industry and its lobbyists, academic analysts, and even the Governor of the
Federal Reserve Board himself, who suggested that if TILA was so
challenging for experts to parse, it could hardly be expected to promote
clarity in consumer decision-making.74 Thus, in 1980, Congress passed the
Truth in Lending Simplification and Reform Act,75 which streamlined a
number of disclosure requirements and, more significantly for the lending
industry, eliminated some of TILA’s more stringent penalties.76 Consumer
67. Paulsen, supra note 11, at 134.
68. See Peterson, supra note 65, at 876.
69. Id. at 879. The full bill was formally termed the “Consumer Credit Protection Act,”
but the “Truth in Lending” label was the popular name at the time and has persisted to this day.
See id.
70. Id. at 880.
71. See id. at 881.
72. See id. at 886-90.
73. Id. at 886.
74. Id. at 888.
75. Pub. L. No. 96-221, tit. VI, 94 Stat. 168 (1980). “The Truth in Lending Simplification
and Reform Act was passed as part of the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary
Control Act which preempted state interest rate caps on first mortgage home loans.” Peterson,
supra note 65, at 889 n.623.
76. See Peterson, supra note 65, at 889 (noting that the changes to TILA were so
significant that the Federal Reserve Board of Governors termed the 1980 revisions as a “new”
TILA).
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lawsuits, which had been both frequent and successful under the original
TILA, stopped almost immediately.77
B. Federal Reserve Board of Governors’ Regulation Z
Regulation Z is “issued by the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve system to implement the federal Truth in Lending Act . . . .”78 The
stated purpose of the regulation is “to promote the informed use of
consumer credit by requiring disclosures about its terms and costs.”79 The
regulation “divides the world of credit into two parts: open-end credit and
closed-end credit.”80 Credit cards are classified as open-end credit, which is
covered in Subpart B of Regulation Z.81 Significantly, “Regulation Z
imposes different disclosure requirements for open-end plans and for closed
end-plans [which primarily include secured loans, such as home
mortgages]. Those for the former are less strict than those for the latter.”82
Although its structure remains the same, Regulation Z was thoroughly
overhauled in the Credit CARD Act of 2009, so a detailed presentation of
the specifics of the original Regulation Z is not useful here.83 In 2004, the
Federal Reserve Board of Governors proposed amending Regulation Z for
the first time since 1981, beginning with its provisions governing openended credit accounts.84 While the proposed changes were sweeping in
scope, affecting “all stages of the creditor-consumer relationship,” they
were nonetheless limited by TILA’s sole emphasis on disclosure and
included no new substantive regulations.85 In 2005, passage of the
Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act prompted the
Board to consider another round of amendments on top of those already
under consideration.86 After much testing and input from a wide array of
groups, which notably did not include any groups representing the specific
interests of elderly credit card consumers,87 the Board promulgated its
77. Id. at 890.
78. 12 C.F.R. § 226.1(a) (2010).
79. Id. § 226.1(b).
80. Paulsen, supra note 11, at 135.
81. 12 C.F.R. § 226.1(d)(2).
82. Paulsen, supra note 11, at 135-36.
83. See Mary Beth Matthews, The Credit CARD Act of 2009 — What Is It, and What Does
It Do?, 2010 ARK. L. NOTES 65, 65 n.4 (referencing the hundreds of pages of revisions to
Regulation Z which were promulgated after the passage of the Credit CARD Act).
84. Paulsen, supra note 11, at 139.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 140.
87. See id. at 145-46 (noting that “only two of the participants in the Board’s consumer
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revisions in January 2009.88 Given that “[e]ach of these January 2009
Revisions contains provisions that are affected by the Credit CARD Act,” a
detailed discussion of these revisions would be superfluous here.89
C. Praise and Criticism of the Truth-in-Lending Act and Regulation Z
Any proposed reform or revision to existing consumer credit protection
law begs the question of why the existing law is inadequate. Legal
historian Christopher Peterson argues that TILA’s emphasis on disclosure
to the exclusion of other substantive regulations has proven “unusually
attractive in the American political climate.”90 Conservatives support
disclosure requirements because they are “directed at fixing a breakdown in
the private decision-making process which guides markets to optimal
outcomes.”91 Liberals, on the other hand, support disclosure regulations
because they “provide consumers with an important opportunity to protect
themselves from credit bargains that are not truly in their own best
interests.”92 Even the lending industry, “rarely welcoming government
oversight, has still come to a grudging acceptance of TILA.”93 In short,
TILA was well-received by many in spite of its flaws.
Nevertheless, consumer credit reform advocates came to view TILA and
Regulation Z as hopelessly inadequate to protect consumers. In her 2007
Senate testimony, consumer advocate Elizabeth Warren alleged that under
the existing law, “credit card agreements are incomprehensible.”94 And the
problem has only worsened under the TILA regime: “in the early 1980s,
the typical credit card contract was a page long. But by the early 2000s,
that contract had grown to more than 30 pages of incomprehensible text.”95
research were over the age of sixty, and those two only participated in a single, early-stage
focus group”). Interestingly, the AARP does not appears to have lobbied for greater
involvement for the elderly in the Board’s consumer research. Perhaps this should come as no
surprise, given that the front page of the AARP website frequently features a prominent
advertisement for an AARP-Chase credit card. See AARP, http://www.AARP.org (last visited
Jan. 18, 2011).
88. Koppel et al., supra note 6, at 206.
89. Id.
90. Peterson, supra note 65, at 881.
91. Id. at 883.
92. Id. at 884. Peterson notes that political liberals “hope for additional regulations that
more completely clamp down on high-cost lending,” but that they approve of disclosure
regulations as “at least a palatably good start.” Id.
93. Id. at 881 (“In particular, high-cost creditors have advocated disclosure rules to deflect
legislative pressure for more substantive rules.”).
94. Warren Testimony, supra note 2, at 1.
95. Id. at 4.
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Christopher Peterson, who has an overall favorable view of TILA, still
admitted that:
[T]o date, Truth in Lending has not lived up to its potential. The
challenge for consumer advocates is to rhetorically recapture
disclosure law from industry lobbyists. To do so, consumer
advocates must recast the goal of disclosure law as aiming not
merely to truthfully describe contracts, but as aiming to create
practical contractual understanding on the part of vulnerable
debtors. Anything less risks wasting the historically unique
opportunity of credit disclosure law as yet another demobilizing
illusion of debtor protection.96
TILA’s inadequacies raised even more alarm among consumer credit
protection advocates who focused on the unique vulnerabilities of elderly
credit card consumers. For example, recognizing that revising TILA to add
substantive consumer protections for all might be an uphill political battle,
one commentator even suggested limiting additional protections “only to
those aged sixty or over.”97 But whether their proposals were for elderspecific rules or protections for all, the efforts of consumer credit reform
advocates eventually began to catch the attention of Congress.
IV. Credit Card Accountability, Responsibility, and Disclosure Act of 2009
While the Federal Reserve Board of Governors was undertaking its
multi-year revision of Regulation Z’s open-end credit rules, legislative
efforts to enact substantive credit card reform began percolating through
Congress.98 These legislative efforts, spearheaded by Senator Christopher
Dodd and his colleagues on the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing,
and Urban Affairs, culminated in the passage of the Credit CARD Act of
2009, which was signed into law by President Obama on May 22, 2009.99
The Act has been praised as “provid[ing] more clarity” than the January
2009 Revisions promulgated by the Federal Reserve Board of Governors.100
The Act strengthens disclosure requirements across the board and, for the
first time, adds a number of substantive protections for credit card
consumers. What follows is a summary of those provisions which seem
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

Peterson, supra note 65, at 903.
Harkness, supra note 5, at 23.
Koppel et al., supra note 6, at 205-06.
Id.
Id. at 206.
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most likely to impact, for better or worse, elderly credit card consumers.101
These provisions may be broken down into the following six categories:
changes in terms, finance charges, payments and due dates, ability to pay,
enhanced disclosures, and special protections for targeted groups. Where
appropriate, new Regulation Z rules will also be summarized.
A. Changes in Terms
The overarching goal of changes in terms regulations is to prevent
surprise changes that affect the cost of credit, whether those changes are
made to existing accounts or spring up as a result of a “bait and switch”
offer of new credit. The Credit CARD Act requires that all interest rate
increases (which are permitted, subject to some regulation) and all
“significant changes” be preceded by forty-five days of notice, which
includes the right to close the account before the changes go into effect.102
The Federal Reserve Board of Governors is tasked with defining
“significant changes” and has adopted a broad definition.103 With a few
exceptions, changes in terms cannot be applied retroactively to any
outstanding balance.104 If an interest rate is increased due to the “credit risk
of the obligor, market conditions, or other factors,” then the creditor must
review the account “once every six months” to determine if it is eligible for
an interest rate reduction.105 Finally, the Act prohibits changing most terms
during the first year of a credit card account, and requires promotional
interest rates to continue for a six-month minimum.106

101. Several sections of the Credit CARD Act are omitted from the summary to follow.
This is because the Act contained regulations of gift cards and other prepaid cards, a number of
miscellaneous provisions that bear little or no relationship to credit card regulation, and a
number of “housekeeping” sections with no substantive content.
102. Credit Card Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure (CARD) Act of 2009, Pub.
L. No. 111-24, sec. 101(a), § 127(i)(1), 123 Stat. 1734, 1735 (to be codified in scattered
sections of 15 U.S.C.).
103. See 12 C.F.R. § 226.9(c)(2)(ii) (2010).
104. Credit CARD Act sec. 101(b), § 171(b). The exceptions are (1) increases “upon the
expiration of a specified [and disclosed] period of time”; (2) increases in a variable annual
percentage rate (an APR that is tied to an indexed rate) due to changes in the index; (3)
increases “due to the completion of a workout or temporary hardship arrangement”; and (4)
penalty increases due to failure of the credit card holder to tender a minimum payment for 60
days. Id.
105. Id. sec. 101(c), § 148.
106. Id. sec. 101(d), § 172.
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B. Finance Charges
The Credit CARD Act places limits (some stringent and some not-sostringent) on several fees commonly charged by credit card companies.
Fees for failure to pay in full during an interest-free period are prohibited.107
Over-the-limit fees are also prohibited unless the credit card consumer has
expressly elected to allow over-the-limit charges to be approved after
having been advised of the fee.108 Payment fees are prohibited unless “such
payment involves an expedited service by a service representative of the
creditor.”109 Finally, all “penalty” fees (such as late fees) must be
“reasonable or proportional to [the] omission or violation” that gave rise to
the fee.110
The Federal Reserve Board of Governors is tasked with defining
“reasonable or proportional.”111 The definition, as promulgated in March
2010, is extraordinarily complex, but does contain at least a few clear-cut
rules: “penalty fees may not exceed the dollar amount of the violation”
(meaning that if a credit card user goes over the limit by five dollars, the
over-the-limit fee cannot exceed five dollars) and “multiple fees may not be
assessed for a single violation.”112 Notably, while the Act regulates those
fees that fall into one of the above fee categories, it does not impose an
across-the-board ban on the development of new fees, or promulgate a
schedule of approved fees.
C. Payments and Due Dates
The Credit CARD Act contains a number of practical changes which
help credit card users attain the most beneficial application of their
payments and make it easier for customers to make payments on time.
First, payments that are received by 5:00 p.m. on the due date must be
classified as on time.113 Second, payments must be applied to whatever

107. Id. sec. 102(a), § 127.
108. Id. Copies of sample opt-in forms are available at Truth in Lending, Regulation Z,
Final Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 37526-01, 37583 (June 29, 2010) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 226).
109. Credit CARD Act § 102(a).
110. Id. sec. 102(b), § 149.
111. Id.
112. Matthews, supra note 83, at 72-73. Professor Matthews has accomplished the
Herculean task of condensing multiple pages of Federal Regulations into a single paragraph,
which presents a useful summary of the Federal Reserve Board of Governors’ highly intricate
definition of “reasonable and proportional.”
113. Credit CARD Act sec. 104, § 164.
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balance on the card bears the highest rate of interest.114 Third, payments
that are late within sixty days of a “material change in the mailing address,
office, or procedures for handing cardholder payments” cannot cause a late
fee or other finance charge to be assessed.115 Fourth, payment of fees (other
than over-the-limit fees, late fees, or insufficient funds fees) during the first
year of an account can only be charged against 25% of the available
credit.116 It appears that the goal of this regulation is to force credit card
companies to close delinquent accounts rather than piling on fees.
Unfortunately, exempting over-the-limit fees, late fees, and insufficient
funds fees takes most of the bite out of this regulation. Fifth, payment due
dates must be on the same date each month, unless that date is a weekend or
holiday, in which case the due date must be the next business day.117
Finally, billing statements must be sent at least twenty-one days before the
due date.118
D. Ability to Pay
One of the Credit CARD Act’s most noteworthy provisions is § 109: “A
card issuer may not open any credit card account for any consumer . . . or
increase any credit limit applicable to such account, unless the card issuer
considers the ability of the consumer to make the required payments under
the terms of such account.”119 This provision, while vague, is probably
intended to have a chilling effect on indiscriminate lending practices,
especially with respect to highly-profitable non-regular payers. To the
extent that it is used to accomplish that purpose, this statute could become
one of the Credit CARD Act’s most useful and significant substantive
consumer protections because it has the potential of shifting the risk of
predatory lending away from consumers by holding lenders accountable for
indiscriminate offers of credit.
E. Enhanced Disclosures
The Credit CARD Act requires each billing statement to contain a payoff
notice.120 The notice must contain four pieces of information: (1) the
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id. sec. 105, § 127(n).
117. Id. sec. 106, § 127(o).
118. Id. § 163(a).
119. Id. sec. 109, § 150.
120. Id. sec. 201, § 157(b)(11). Anyone who receives a monthly credit card statement has
no doubt seen one of the new payment notice boxes. They were one of the first and most
noticeable changes to take place immediately after the passage of the Credit CARD Act.
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number of months to pay off the entire balance if only the minimum
payment is made; (2) the minimum that would have to be made in order to
pay off the entire balance in thirty-six months; (3) the total cost of choosing
one of these two payment options; and (4) “a toll-free telephone number at
which the consumer may receive information about accessing credit
counseling and debt management services.”121 The information must be “in
a conspicuous and prominent location on the billing statement” and must be
“clear and concise.”122 Also, each billing statement must disclose the
consequences of late payments.123
F. Special Protections for Targeted Groups
The Credit CARD Act acknowledges the need of certain targeted groups
for extra consumer protection. First, Title III of the Act is devoted to
additional protections for students, defined as those under the age of 21.124
Pre-screened offers to students are prohibited.125 No credit card may be
issued to a student unless signed by a cosigner or unless the student
indicates an independent means of making payment.126 Second, the Act
mandates a “Report on Federal Financial and Economic Literacy Education
Programs”127 and a “GAO Study and Report on Fluency in the English
Language and Financial Literacy.”128
These reports demonstrate
congressional interest in providing protections for those with limited
financial and English language skills.
In an effort to ensure that all consumers receive adequate protection, the
Act requires the Federal Reserve Board of Governors to review consumer
credit plans and revise its regulations as needed every two years.129 Regular
reviews of consumer credit regulations will keep consumer credit protection
issues before the Board of Governors on a consistent basis. It is to be
hoped that the Act’s neglect of certain consumer groups, such as the
elderly, may be remedied over time as the biennial reviews reveal which
consumers have fallen through the cracks of existing regulations.130
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. sec. 202, § 127(b)(12).
124. Id. sec. 301, § 127(c).
125. Id. sec. 302, § 604(c)(1)(B).
126. Id. sec. 303, § 127.
127. Id. § 510.
128. Id. § 513.
129. Id. § 502.
130. A word of caution is in order here. While regular reviews may have the effect of
strengthening consumer credit protections, they can have a weakening effect as well. Credit
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V. Analysis: The Credit CARD Act and the Elderly
The Credit CARD Act unquestionably provides a number of significant
new protections to credit card consumers. For example, the Act’s
requirements of greater consistency, predictability, and disclosure from
credit card companies go a long way toward protecting all credit card users,
including the elderly. And while nothing in the Act directly speaks to the
unique needs of elderly credit card consumers, many of its provisions have
the potential of preventing elderly persons from becoming weighed down
by credit card debt in the first place and even providing some relief to those
who are already struggling with credit card debt.131
Nonetheless, the Act contains a number of provisions that, while positive
on their face, contain hidden costs for unwary elderly credit card
consumers. The Act simply fails to provide adequate protections to elderly
credit card consumers threatened by lending practices that are aggressive,
predatory, and unconscionable. In many ways, the Act represents little
more than a cobbling together of a few good ideas and lacks a welldeveloped framework designed to ensure that needed protections were not
omitted. As two attorneys from the National Consumer Law Center
remarked in 2007, “major substantive policy changes are not likely to occur
any time soon. At best, they will be adopted piecemeal.”132 A detailed
examination of the Act reveals that this prediction has unfortunately proven
to be correct. Given the unique position of elderly persons with respect to
credit cards, the Act both could and should have done more to ensure that
elderly credit card consumers receive adequate protection.
A. Changes in Terms Regulations
Credit card contracts are adhesion contracts.133 As such, they generally
give credit card companies sweeping options to change contract terms.134
card industry participation at the biennial reviews is not likely to diminish over time and
industry lobbying will inevitably entail requests for lighter regulations and weaker
enforcement. Thus, consumer credit advocates must also remain unflagging in their efforts to
keep the needs of consumers before the Federal Reserve Board of Governors. The wateringdown over time of the original TILA may serve as a cautionary tale here. See Peterson, supra
note 65, at 886-90.
131. See Harkness, supra note 7, at 19.
132. Loonin & Renuart, supra note 5, at 200.
133. “Adhesion Contract. A standard-form contract prepared by one party, to be signed by
another party in a weaker position, usu. a consumer, who adheres to the contract with little
choice about the terms.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 143 (3d pocket ed. 1996).
134. See Peter A. Alces & Michael M. Greenfield, They Can Do What!? Limitations on the
Use of Change-in-Terms Clauses, 26 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1099, 1101 (2010).

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol64/iss2/4

2012]

COMMENT

191

Given that a defining trait of the current generation of elderly credit card
users is “trust,” the ability of credit card companies to “pull the rug” out
from under an unsuspecting consumer by means of changes to the terms of
a credit card contract can have a highly unsettling impact on an elderly
credit card user and his financial security.135 Unfortunately, while the
Credit CARD Act requires disclosure of changes in terms, there is no
substantive regulation restricting or limiting the time and manner in which
terms may change, eliminating any sense of security for credit card
consumers.136 For instance, the Act’s requirement of forty-five days of
notice of changes in terms, as opposed to the former requirement of fifteen
days,137 provides cold comfort when the notice includes “take it or leave it”
terms that are adverse to the elderly credit card consumer.138 Because the
Act imposes almost no limit on changes in terms as long as credit card
companies comply with disclosure and timing requirements, the only
constant in the world of credit will continue to be change.
The Act’s only remedy for changes in terms which are unsatisfactory to a
consumer is to close the account.139 Indeed, under the Act, a credit card
company may effectively force a consumer to terminate his account by
presenting a Hobson’s choice between accepting intolerable new terms and
conditions or foregoing access to credit entirely. An elderly credit card
consumer faced with this choice may not feel that he is able to close the
account (due to need for credit) even if an announced change in terms
might prove problematic for him. Whether the credit card functions as a
“safety net” or as a liquidity device to ameliorate the challenges of living on
a fixed income, outright account closure may not be a viable option. The
elderly person may fear that if he rejects the change in terms and closes the
account then no further credit will be available to him from any source
because of his age. In spite of this possibility, the Act fails to provide any
means other than account closure for an elderly credit card consumer to
protest, reject, or renegotiate a unilateral and unsatisfactory change in
terms.
To the extent that risk-averse elderly credit card consumers are unable or
unwilling to close accounts upon notification of changes in terms, the
135. See Harkness, supra note 5, at 3-4.
136. See Credit Card Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure (CARD) Act of 2009,
Pub. L. No. 111-24, sec. 101(a), § 127, 123 Stat. 1734, 1738 (to be codified in scattered
sections of 15 U.S.C.).
137. See Paulsen, supra note 11, at 138.
138. See Credit CARD Act sec. 101(a), § 127.
139. Id.

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2012

192

OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 64:171

elderly are more likely to bear the costs of changes in terms than younger
credit card consumers who are in a better position to close unsatisfactory
accounts and apply for cards with more consumer-friendly terms. Indeed, if
one assumes along with Elizabeth Warren that credit card terms and
conditions are based on “a price the company believes it can charge without
causing the consumer to cancel the card,” then it seems inevitable that
credit card companies will continue to charge the most of those who are
least able to cancel: elderly credit card consumers.140
The Act does impose one limitation on creditors who increase interest
rates on accounts based on “the credit risk of the obligor, market conditions,
or other factors.”141 Creditors who do so are required to review the account
every six months to see if it is eligible for an interest rate reduction.142 If
the interest rate was raised due to failure to make minimum payments and
the consumer establishes six months of good payment history, the Act
requires the creditor to lower the interest rate to its pre-penalty level:
This statutory cure provision, which enables delinquent debtors
to reinstate the non-default contract interest rates, is among the
strongest of the consumer protections afforded by the CARD
Act; although most defaulting debtors may not be in a position to
avail themselves of it, for those who are, it will be a definite
benefit.143
Outside of this narrow relief provision, however, nothing in the Act
prohibits creditors from imposing interest rate increases based on “credit
risks” that are tied to elder-specific factors which will never go away
precisely because they are tied to the age of the elderly credit card user—a
quintessentially irreversible factor. For example, creditors might raise
interest rates when an elderly customer begins to receive Social Security
benefits because this signals a “risk” that the elderly person’s income may
be reduced from former levels and that a reduction in payments may follow.
Or creditors might choose to label age itself as a “risk” factor, raising
interest rates on every customer who reaches the age of sixty-five, with
adjustments for further risk every five years thereafter.144 In such cases, no
140. Warren Testimony, supra note 2, at 4.
141. Credit CARD Act sec. 101(c), § 148.
142. Id.
143. Harkness, supra note 7, at 13.
144. This is not an implausible scenario. Because credit card debt is unsecured, a primary
factor affecting repayment is time—either time for the credit card consumer to pay voluntarily
or time for the credit card company to sue for repayment and obtain a judgment against a
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matter how many times and with no matter how much assiduousness the
creditor performs the mandatory six-month review, the review process will
never have the effect of reducing the elderly credit card consumer’s interest
rate for the duration of that consumer’s life.
B. Finance Charges Regulations
The Credit CARD Act regulates, to some extent, all of the major
creditor-originated fees, including penalty fees (such as late fees), over-thelimit fees, and payment fees.145 The Act fails to regulate fees that are
debtor-originated, including over-the-limit fees that result once the debtor
“opts-in” to over-the-limit extensions of credit,146 and third party billing
charges that result from a number of debtor missteps.147 While both of
these types of charges can impact any credit card user, their impact on
elderly credit card users is particularly severe.
The Act allows credit card companies to provide an “opt-in” option for
over-the-limit transactions.148 Basically, the credit card consumer must
give permission for the credit card company to allow an over-the-limit
transaction.149 This permission is only valid if the credit card company has
disclosed any over-the-limit fees that may result.150 In spite of this required
disclosure, the interest of credit card companies in profit maximization will
result in aggressive attempts by credit card companies to “sell” consumers
on the idea of over-the-limit transactions. These sales attempts will have a
disparate impact on elderly credit card consumers, given elderly persons’
propensity to be confused by complex financial information and highdelinquent debtor. Even then, payment may be difficult to obtain if the credit card consumer
simply lacks assets necessary for repayment. The lesser the debtor’s assets, the longer
repayment will take. It is a fact of life that old age, which frequently entails a reduction in
income and assets, is also accompanied by a reduction in the time remaining during which a
credit card consumer can tender payment. Of course, after the death of a debtor, the creditor
may present a claim against the debtor’s estate, but there is no guarantee of repayment if estate
assets are simply lacking or are protected from creditor claims through estate planning devices
such as trusts and statutory protections such as homestead. See Harkness, supra note 5, at 26
(“[I]f the estate is insolvent, the creditor will then be the one that must ultimately bear the
loss.”). Thus, furnishing unsecured credit to elderly persons presents a direct risk of loss to
credit card companies.
145. See Credit CARD Act sec. 102, § 127.
146. See id.
147. See Prentiss Cox, The Invisible Hand of Preacquired Account Marketing, 47 HARV. J.
ON LEGIS. 425, 425 (2010).
148. Credit CARD Act § 102.
149. See id.
150. See id.
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pressure sales techniques.151 The Act fails to regulate the extent to which
credit card companies may attempt to entice consumers to agree to overthe-limit transactions and their accompanying fees. The Act also continues
to allow credit card companies “to extend credit in excess of consumer
credit limits in the absence of this election, but only if they are willing to do
so without charging any over the limit fees.”152 Thus, elderly credit card
consumers, believing that by opting-out they will avoid exceeding their
credit limit entirely, may be surprised when their credit card company
simply sidesteps their decision to opt-out by approving over-the-limit
transactions (without the fee) in order to increase their total indebtedness.
The Act also fails to regulate third party billing practices. In brief, a
definition of third party billing is:
[A] sales practice that allows companies to charge consumers for
services they do not know they have ordered and do not use.
The practice depends on a seller’s ability to access a consumer’s
financial account without the consumer directly providing her
account number to that seller. This is possible because the seller
has paid either a financial institution, such as a bank, or another
seller who retains consumer account numbers for the right to
charge the consumer’s account.153
A typical third party billing involves some sort of gimmick, such as a
“free trial offer,” which if not rejected, constitutes acceptance of an offer
for a subscription to a product or service.154 Very frequently, these
“services” are of little or no value to elderly credit card consumers. While
the origin of the third party charge is usually an outside enterprise, credit
card companies also market similar “services” directly. For example, the
court in Discover Bank v. Owens found that:
[Owens’] account was debited $10.43 for a Discover card
product called CreditSafe Plus, which evidently would put her
payments and finance charges on hold without affecting her
credit rating should she become unemployed, hospitalized, or
disabled. Presumably, since Owens was on Social Security
151. See Moore & Schaefer, supra note 25, at 518-19; see also Harkness, supra note 7, at
15 (criticizing the Credit CARD Act’s over-the-limit opt-in provision for failing to require that
customers who have opted-in be notified that a particular transaction will put them over their
credit limit).
152. Harkness, supra note 7, at 15.
153. Cox, supra note 147, at 425.
154. See id. at 428-37 (detailing a number of third party billing schemes).

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol64/iss2/4

2012]

COMMENT

195

Disability and already unemployed, the CreditSafe product
pertained only to the eventuality of her becoming
hospitalized. . . . At what point in the life of an unemployed,
disabled, impoverished person was such a product ever designed
to be used?155
It is precisely because of the tricky nature of third party and direct
product billing practices that elderly credit card consumers are highly
vulnerable to such schemes.156 In the case of a third party billing, the credit
card company itself escapes the “appearance of evil” by simply billing the
credit card account for the third party service and reaping the benefits of
fees charged to the third party company for account access and also finance
charges stemming from the increase in total account debt. In the case of
direct product billing, the credit card company also enjoys almost pure
profit by charging consumers for nearly-useless “products.” While analysis
of third party billing has prompted calls for separate legislative treatment,157
the Credit CARD Act could and should have tackled the credit card
industry’s use and abuse of this practice. As the law stands today, credit
card companies are not even required to disclose third party billing
practices, let alone put a stop to them.
The Act contains two provisions regarding creditor-originated fees which
are likely to have a disproportionate impact on elderly credit card
consumers. First, the Act allows payment fees when payments “involve an
expedited service by a service representative of the creditor.”158 In practice,
this provision means that payments made over the phone within a few
business days of the due date can incur a payment charge.159 But elderly
credit card consumers, especially those that are homebound, are much more
likely than other age groups to use the phone to make their credit card
payments, thus incurring the fee.160 Second, the Act’s requirement that
155. 822 N.E.2d 869, 871-72, 874 (Cleveland Mun. Ct. 2004). Ms. Owens was eventually
charged $369.52 for the CreditSafe Plus product. See id. at 872.
156. See Cox, supra note 147, at 438-61 (presenting a detailed analysis of how third party
billing practices are intentionally designed to be confusing).
157. See id. at 425.
158. Credit Card Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure (CARD) Act of 2009, Pub.
L. No. 111-24, sec. 102(a), §127(l), 123 Stat. 1734, 1740 (to be codified in scattered sections of
15 U.S.C.).
159. See Written Testimony of Michael D. Donovan: Hearing Before the S. Comm. On
Banking, Hous. & Urban Affairs, 110th Cong. 9 (2007) [hereinafter Donovan Testimony]
(statement of Michael D. Donovan, Partner, Donovan Searles, LLC).
160. See Moore & Schaefer, supra note 25, at 518 (noting that senior citizens “depend on
the telephone for contact with . . . the outside world”).
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certain fees be “reasonable and proportional” to the violation that gave rise
to the fee will almost certainly prompt credit card companies to raise
minimum payments so that a higher dollar amount will then be associated
with certain violations, such as late payments.161 To the extent that a cashstrapped elderly credit card consumer is unable to make these higher
minimum payments, he will accrue even more fees.
Finally, the Act’s failure to prohibit the creation of new fees or to
promulgate a list of approved fees has prompted credit card companies to
develop a number of new fees. Credit card companies are infamous for
their endless creativity in devising new fees.162 With no limitations on fees
outside of those explicitly covered by the Act, creditors may be expected to
develop a number of new revenue-raising techniques: “The card companies
employ teams of people whose sole job is to jigger and re-jigger credit card
terms so that more money drains out of consumers’ pockets—and, with a
little luck, the consumer won’t even notice until it is too late.”163
For example, credit card companies are compensating for lost revenue
caused by Credit CARD Act provisions by “product changing” customers
into cards that have annual fees.164 Typically, a consumer is not aware that
an annual fee has been added to his card until after it is charged to his
account. Given elderly persons’ difficulties with understanding financial
documents and reading small print, the addition of an annual fee to an
elderly credit card consumer’s account is likely to go undetected by that
consumer. Elderly credit card consumers who keep their card as a “safety
net” for emergencies may expect that nothing will be charged to their card
without their knowledge and consent. If such consumers are unaware that
an annual fee has been added to their account, they will neglect to tender
payment and late fees and other charges soon follow. As another example,
the Credit CARD Act does not prohibit credit card companies from
charging fees to receive a paper bill.165 While credit card companies may
assert that paper bill fees are prompted by altruistic environmental concerns
related to reducing creation of paper waste,166 the reality is that e-billing
161. Credit CARD Act sec. 102(b), § 149(a).
162. See Donovan Testimony, supra note 159, at 9-10 (listing over thirteen fees charged by
credit card companies, including set-up fees charged to open a credit card account and fees for
furnishing credit card customers with the actual plastic card required to make purchases).
163. Warren Testimony, supra note 2, at 6.
164. Don Mecoy, Credit CARD Act of 2009: Taking the Good with the Bad, DAILY
OKLAHOMAN, Sep. 5, 2010, at 6C.
165. After logging on to almost any credit card account management website, customers
must click through a screen asking them to enroll in e-billing.
166. See, e.g., Get Paperless Statements & Save Trees, DISCOVER FIN. SERVICES, http://
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saves credit card companies postage costs while simultaneously increasing
the chance that a consumer may forget or be unable to access and read their
statement online, thus allowing late fees to kick in. Penalizing paper bill
use has a disparate effect on those elderly persons who are unable or
unwilling to transact financial business over the Internet and on those who
simply prefer, for personal reasons, to receive hard copies of their financial
statements.
C. Payment and Due Date Regulations
Some of the Credit CARD Act’s payment and due date regulations are
helpful to elderly credit card consumers. In particular, the regulations
governing payment procedure provide much-needed certainty regarding
exactly when payments are due.167 The simple fact of a mandatory regular
due date will help elderly consumers remember when payments are due and
avoid late fees. The “next business day” provision for due dates falling on
a weekend or holiday are beneficial to those elderly credit card consumers
who, for cultural or personal reasons, may not expect businesses to be open
on those days and may time their payment accordingly.168 Unfortunately,
while the Act’s payment and due date regulations provide some basic relief
to paying customers on the micro level, it is on the macro level that the
Act’s protections for elderly credit card consumers are potentially nonexistent, as the next section shows.
D. Ability to Pay Requirement
Section 109 of the Credit CARD Act requires credit card companies to
consider “ability to pay” before extending credit.169 Yet this requirement is
so vague that it provides little real protection to elderly credit card
consumers. Elderly credit card consumers’ abilities to pay may be limited
by a number of financial factors including high costs of living, low
incomes, and overall reduced wealth. Because many of these factors may
be new and unfamiliar to elderly credit card consumers, their own ability to
furnish a credit card company with an accurate assessment of their ability to
pay may be limited. In addition, issues of capacity and identity may impair
www.discovercard.com/customer-service/statements/paperless.html (last visited Feb. 13,
2011).
167. See Credit Card Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure (CARD) Act of 2009,
sec. 104, 106, §§ 164, 127, Pub. L. No. 111-24, 123 Stat. 1734,1741-43 (to be codified in
scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
168. See id. § 106.
169. Id. sec. 109, § 150.
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the ability of a credit card company to fulfill its duties under the Act. Issues
of capacity implicate the need for credit card companies to assess whether
an elderly credit card applicant is competent to enter into a credit card
contract.170 Issues of identity implicate the need for credit card companies
to ensure that applications in the name of an elderly person in fact
originated with that person.
Perhaps because of these challenges, the Federal Reserve Board of
Governors did not promulgate a strict regulation to implement § 109 of the
Credit CARD Act: “the Board’s regulations provide that the reasonable
measure of the consumer’s ability to pay centers around the ability to make
minimum payments.”171 This regulation is so deferential to creditors as to
have the effect of rendering this section of the Credit CARD Act nearly
moot. While the Act has the apparent effect of shifting the risk of lending
away from borrowers and onto credit card companies, its vagueness largely
eliminates any additional burden for creditors because in the absence of
specific rules, it is simply too easy for creditors to rebut an allegation that
they did not consider a particular elderly credit card consumer’s “ability to
pay.”
Weakened by its own vagueness and feeble regulatory
implementation, § 109 of the Credit CARD Act, while having the potential
to be greatly helpful in preventing improvident extensions of credit to
vulnerable elderly persons, in fact lacks the necessary teeth to accomplish
its purpose.
E. Enhanced Disclosures
The Credit CARD Act requires credit card companies to include a
complex payoff disclosure with each billing statement.172 The disclosure
includes two payoff options (minimum payment and thirty-six-month
payoff payment) along with the total amount that the consumer will pay
under either option.173 Thus, at least four dollar amounts are listed next to
one another for comparison purposes, one of which matches the minimum
payment due. Elderly credit card consumers confronting this disclosure
may become confused and remit more payment than is actually due. While
paying more than the minimum payment is generally beneficial to any
credit card holder, paying more than the minimum because of confusion
may not be beneficial for someone on a fixed income.
170. See Paulsen, supra note 11, at 133.
171. Harkness, supra note 7, at 16. Professor Harkness opines that “resort to the ability to
make minimum payments as the criterion for creditworthiness seems ill-advised.” Id.
172. See Credit CARD Act sec. 201, § 127(b)(11).
173. Id.
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The Act further requires the payoff disclosure to include a “credit
counseling” phone number.174 Elderly credit card consumers are likely to
conduct business over the phone and may inaccurately conclude that the
credit counseling number is a regular customer service number. Yet
phoning a credit counseling service can open up an elderly credit card
consumer to additional financial trouble and potential exploitation:
Despite their promises of debt relief, many of these counseling
agencies exploit their customer’s vulnerabilities and leave them
deeper in financial trouble. For starters, credit counseling
agency fees are often excessive, depriving consumers of funds
that they could otherwise use to pay off debts. After receiving a
superficial financial analysis, many consumers are pushed into
debt management plans (“DMPs”) that they cannot afford.
These DMPs generally are developed through arrangements
between credit counseling agencies and creditors. They can help
consumers if the concessions offered by the creditors are
meaningful, but creditors have persistently cut back on their
concessions in recent years.175
Thus, the Act’s required payoff disclosure may actually harm elderly
credit card consumers more than help them.
F. Special Protections for Targeted Groups
The Credit CARD Act includes protections for young people176 and
mandates financial literacy studies.177 While the studies may have some
tangential benefits to elderly persons, the Act as a whole lacks special
protections for elderly credit card consumers.
On the one hand, including special protections for a specific age group,
but not including protections for the elderly sets an unfortunate precedent
for omitting protections for elderly credit card consumers from future
consumer credit protection legislation. Such a precedent is dismaying,
given that many characteristics of elderly credit card users strongly indicate
a need for special protections. On the other hand, the inclusion of special
protections for a segment of population based on their age (young people)
implies that Congress might be willing to consider special protections for
elderly credit card users. Improvements to the special protections for young
174.
175.
176.
177.

Id.
Loonin & Renuart, supra note 5, at 189 (footnotes omitted).
See Credit CARD Act sec. 301-305, §§ 127, 604(c)(1)(B), 140.
See id. §§ 510, 513.

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2012

200

OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 64:171

people will almost certainly be considered in the future, given that criticism
is already being leveled against them.178 When such improvements are
considered, Congress can and should also consider enacting statutory
protections for elderly credit card consumers.
As long as elderly persons lack a consumer credit protection statute
specifically targeted to their needs and vulnerabilities, credit card
companies, facing potential losses from their reduced ability to issue cards
to young consumers, will compensate for these losses by shifting them to
current account holders. Thus, in addition to enjoying no special
protections under the Act, the elderly will ultimately bear part of the cost of
protecting other favored groups.
VI. Finding Protection for Elderly Credit Card Consumers: A Proposed
Solution
In the years leading up to the passage of the Credit CARD Act, there
were many calls for reform of existing law, some of which examined the
problem of consumer credit protection through the lens of the unique needs
of elderly credit card consumers.179 These proposals highlighted the
challenges of passing special consumer credit protections for the elderly.
Indeed, some questioned whether the elderly required any special
protections at all.180 A proposal for an elder-specific consumer credit
protection statute must begin by acknowledging this debate and explaining
why such a statute is necessary. Therefore, some responses to various
criticisms of the alleged need for an elder-specific consumer credit
protection statute are presented below.
In addition, several valuable contributions have already been made
regarding protections for elderly credit card consumers. Unfortunately,
many well-intentioned recent proposals fall short for one of two reasons.
First, some proposals consist almost entirely of ideas which were fully
incorporated into the Credit CARD Act.181 Yet, as has been shown, the Act
178. See Regina L. Hinson, Credit Card Reform Goes to College, 14 N.C. BANKING INST.
287, 288, 307-08 (2010) (criticizing the Credit CARD Act’s protections for young people for
making it “extremely difficult, and in some cases impossible, for young consumers to establish
and maintain credit in a safe and responsible manner” and suggesting that the real problem
confronting young credit card users is a lack of financial literacy, not predatory lending).
179. See, e.g., Harkness, supra note 5, at 22-23; Loonin & Renuart, supra note 5, at 189-93.
180. Loonin & Renuart, supra note 5, at 190.
181. Elizabeth Warren’s and Donna Harkness’s proposals fall into this category. See
Warren Testimony, supra note 2, at 7-8 (urging enactment of the Credit CARD Act, but
emphasizing that the Act would only be effective when accompanied by robust regulatory
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not only fails to protect elderly credit card consumers but also imposes a
number of significant new costs on them. Second, some proposals focus on
solving a narrow issue while overlooking the big picture need for a
comprehensive statutory solution to the problems facing elderly credit card
consumers. For example, one proposal recommends statutory regulation of
third-party billing alone.182 While these proposals may be quite useful,
some synthesis needs to be done in order to prevent further legislative work
from merely extending the ad hoc approach that has characterized consumer
credit protection statutes thus far.
Ultimately, adding provisions to the existing Act or passing piecemeal
statutes that address a smattering of elder-specific issues will not result in
robust consumer protections for elderly credit card consumers. Instead,
Congress should enact a consumer protection statute that specifically
targets the needs of elderly credit card consumers. This section contains a
number of statutory recommendations that aim to resolve some of the
concerns addressed above regarding the unique vulnerabilities of elderly
credit card consumers under existing law.
Finally, although existing law is clearly inadequate to protect elderly
credit card consumers, it does provide some protection. Elderly credit card
consumers should take full advantage of the few substantive protections the
Credit CARD Act and Regulation Z actually provide. Meanwhile, a small
but growing cohort of judges are leading the way in applying traditional
contract doctrines in new ways in order to prevent financial exploitation of
elderly credit card consumers. For the practitioner and her elderly client, a
review of existing statutory and judicial resources is far more helpful than
calls for future reform. For that reason, this section concludes with a brief
summary of how attorneys and their elderly credit card holding clients can
find some limited protection under existing law.
A. The Need for Elder-Specific Consumer Credit Protection
Some commentators have proposed that general consumer protections
are sufficient to protect the elderly.183 They suggest that the real problem is
that existing consumer protection statutes are adequate in content but
oversight); Harkness, supra note 5, at 23-28 (limiting her proposal to “four revisions to
TILA”).
182. See Cox, supra note 147, at 481-82.
183. See, e.g., Loonin & Renuart, supra note 5, at 189-90 (“Generally, we favor policy
reforms that apply to the general public unless the problem to be addressed affects only elders.
Where an issue rises to the level of public concern and impacts the larger society, we think any
regulatory solution should protect the public as a whole and not just a select segment.”).
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inadequate in enforcement, leaving all persons, including the elderly,
vulnerable.184 In 2007, Elizabeth Warren agreed that “[e]ncouraging more
vigorous oversight from regulatory commissions so that they use the tools
at their disposal more effectively would make a difference.”185 Certainly,
stronger enforcement would have the effect of protecting all consumers,
regardless of age. Nonetheless, given that many credit card industry
practices have a disproportionately harmful effect on elderly credit card
consumers, elder-specific statutory protections are necessary regardless of
how existing laws are enforced. In fact, regulators may be more likely to
enforce a specifically-tailored statute, given the ability to target
enforcement efforts to a specific population.
Some commentators have expressed concern regarding the potential for
elder-specific consumer protection laws to be paternalistic—shielding
competent elderly consumers from full participation in the market: “The
key question is whether the benefits of special protections for vulnerable
elders outweigh the loss of autonomy for those who are competent and able
to make independent decisions.”186 The concern here is one of balance.
Certainly, consumer protection laws which unduly cabin the rights of fully
competent elderly persons to engage freely in financial decision-making
and market participation are excessive in one direction. The current state of
the law, however, with its lack of meaningful protections for elderly credit
card consumers, shows a lack of balance in the other direction. While the
drafter of an elder-specific consumer credit protection statute must remain
sensitive to the need for balance, this sensitivity should not prompt him to
abandon the endeavor entirely. While some have even suggested that
robust elder-specific consumer protection could result in elderly persons
being squeezed out of the market, it is important to remember that
“additional credit is not beneficial to borrowers if its terms are unfair.”187
A final concern regarding elder-specific consumer credit protection
legislation is the notion that the difficulties that elderly persons face under
the current state of the law are largely of their own making: “Spending
sprees and living beyond one’s means can leave someone in a deep hole
with credit card debt.
For those mistakes, people need to take
responsibility.”188 One must consider the bigger picture, however, before
passing judgment on struggling credit card debtors:
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.

See id.
Warren Testimony, supra note 2, at 8.
Loonin & Renuart, supra note 5, at 190.
Id. at 193.
Warren Testimony, supra note 2, at 5.
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In a world in which real incomes are not rising, while mortgage
costs, health insurance, child care and transportation continue
their upward climb, credit card debt is not just about the
profligate. It is about hard-working, play-by-the-rules families
who are doing their best but who, in the ups and downs of
everyday life, sometimes need credit. Only after they have
seized the rope offered by the credit card companies, do some of
them discover that the other end is tied to an anchor.189
It is precisely to protect this second kind of consumer that elder-specific
consumer credit protection statutes are necessary. Elderly persons are
much more likely to find themselves in the latter category of “sometimes
needing credit” than in the former category of “profligate spenders.”190
Unfortunately, regardless of the reason why an elderly person acquires
credit card debt in the first place, that person will quickly discover that the
law affords little more than the most barebones protections.
Thus, contrary to the assertion that the elderly do not need or deserve
special consumer credit protections and may actually be harmed by any
such laws, it is clear that the unique position of elderly persons with respect
to credit cards compels the conclusion that elder-specific protections are in
fact necessary.
B. Suggestions for an Elder-Specific Consumer Credit Statute
Drafting a comprehensive elder-specific consumer protection statute is
beyond the scope of a single article. Regulation in this area is staggering in
its length and its complexity.191 Indeed, the impenetrability of consumer
credit law has been a frequent complaint of consumer advocates, who
believe that vital protections are choked by a maze of superfluous
regulations.192 Therefore, it is not the intent of this proposal to draft a
thorough legislative blueprint or to impose limits on what ought to be
considered. Rather, this proposal draws on lessons learned during the last
half-century from American consumer credit protection law to suggest
some fundamental and practical elder-specific protections that should not
be omitted from any substantive elder-specific consumer protection statute.
189. Id. at 7.
190. See Harkness, supra note 7, at 12-13 (explaining that although elderly persons are
reluctant to relinquish a “lifetime of self-sufficiency and financial independence,” the slippery
slope of credit card use claims many elderly victims).
191. See Matthews, supra note 83, at 65 (noting that regulations promulgated pursuant to
the Credit CARD Act are “complicated, detailed, and lengthy”).
192. See Peterson, supra note 65, at 814-15.
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1. Changes in Terms
There are two approaches to changes in terms regulations for elderly
credit card consumers that seem particularly sound. The first involves an
outright ban on changes in terms absent cardholder consent once consumers
reach a certain age. The second, more creditor-friendly approach, involves
imposing on creditors a duty of good faith and fair dealing.193 Both
approaches involve shifting some of the risk of lending back onto the
creditor by requiring both borrower and lender to maintain original terms
throughout the life of the loan. The simplicity of either of these approaches
would cut through the complex changes in terms rules that apply today,
enabling elderly credit card consumers to understand their financial
positions better.
The first approach has the advantage of being both simple and elegant: a
statutory provision adopting this approach would simply ban changes in
terms after a specified age (seventy-five, for example) on existing accounts
unless the cardholder consented to the change. If terms were changed in a
manner adverse to the cardholder during the twenty-four months preceding
the cardholder’s reaching the statutory age, the burden would be on the
credit card company to establish that the reason for changing terms was not
based on the upcoming age deadline.
This approach is not without its shortfalls. It is so strict that it would
necessitate giving credit card companies the option to close the account
outright in certain specified circumstances, since a flat ban would prevent
them from using a change in terms to ensure that problematic accounts
remained profitable. For example, no credit card company should be forced
to keep an account open when payments are not being made. The negative
impact that such account closure might have on the elderly credit card
consumer, however, should be cushioned by extending the required notice
to a period of substantial length, perhaps six months. This would provide
the elderly credit card consumer time to make other financial arrangements
before the account was closed.
The second approach of imposing a statutory duty of good faith and fair
dealing on changes in terms has the advantage of being more flexible for
both the creditor and the debtor. On the creditor’s side, the ability to
change terms allows the creditor to retain profitability in the face of
changes in debtor behavior. On the debtor’s side, the ability for the lender
to change terms means that the lender may be more willing to extend credit
in larger amounts and over longer periods of time, as needed. To avoid
193. See Loonin & Renuart, supra note 5, at 192.
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reentering the morass of tricks and gimmicks that exists under current law,
however, the statutory duty would be accompanied by a cause of action for
a debtor to assert that the creditor has breached this duty with respect to a
particular change in terms.194 While a return to the flurry of litigation that
followed the 1968 enactment of TILA might be unhelpful,195 a solid
increase in successful litigation by elderly credit card consumers could go a
long way toward putting the credit card industry on notice that mistreatment
of their elderly customers is unacceptable.
Undoubtedly other methods of preventing unpredictable and
disadvantageous changes in terms for elderly credit card consumers are
available. What is clear is that an elder-specific consumer credit protection
statute must impose substantive limitations on such changes.
2. Finance Charges
Presumably, changes in terms regulations would prohibit the surprise
introduction of new fees—one of the most serious problems discussed
above. But an elder-specific consumer credit protection statute must also
address “debtor-originated” fees such as over-the-limit opt-in fees196 and
third party billing fees.197
The Credit CARD Act’s consent-based approach to over-the-limit fees is
useful. However, substantive protections are needed to ensure that
marketing techniques designed to sell this option are fair and reasonable.
Creditors should be limited to offering over-the-limit opt-ins to their elderly
consumers to only a few times a year, perhaps every six months. Such a
limitation would help prevent elderly consumers from being harassed into
accepting over-the-limit charges. An occasional statement insert, modeled
after the Federal Reserve Board of Governor’s recommendations,198 would
allow elderly credit card consumers time to reach a thoughtful decision as
to whether this option might be right for them. Meanwhile, full disclosure
of the results of such a decision should be mandatory. If the elderly credit
194. See id. at 195-96 (noting that strengthening consumer credit protection laws and
providing causes of action requires additional legislative efforts to ensure that elderly persons
have real access to the justice system).
195. See Peterson, supra note 65, at 886-87.
196. See Credit Card Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure (CARD) Act of 2009,
Pub. L. No. 111-24, sec. 102(a), § 127, 123 Stat. 1734, 1738 (to be codified in scattered
sections of 15 U.S.C.).
197. See Cox, supra note 147, at 480 (“Preacquired account marketing [third party billing]
should be banned.”).
198. See Truth in Lending, Regulation Z, 75 Fed. Reg. 37526-01, 37583 (June 29, 2010) (to
be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 226).

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2012

206

OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 64:171

card consumer decides to accept over-the-limit transactions and fees, he
should be informed as to the consequences of that decision, including
whether or not the credit card company will notify him when an over-thelimit transaction has occurred. If the elderly credit card consumer decides
to reject over-the-limit transactions and fees, he should be advised as to
how the credit card company will treat attempts to use a credit line beyond
its limit.
Unlike over-the-limit fees, which may be a helpful option for some
consumers, the economic consequences of third party billing are extreme:
Preacquired marketing [third party billing] works like an
invisible hand. Not the sort that magically aligns buyers and
sellers in equilibrium to promote maximum wealth. Rather, an
invisible hand that selectively reaches into the pockets of those
consumers who fall victim to this practice. . . . It appears that
almost none of the consumers whose accounts are charged are
aware of or want the service, and the deceptive effect of this type
of marketing falls hardest on those with the least defenses
against marketplace misconduct—people with limited English
language skill or mental diminishment.199
Given the foregoing statement, it seems obvious that an elder-specific
consumer credit protection statute must simply ban third party billing
outright. Elderly credit card consumers should not be burdened with the
frustration of sorting out legitimate from illegitimate charges and
attempting to reverse charges that they never approved in the first place.
On this point, a page of anecdote is worth a volume of logic.200
3. Financial Literacy
While the American tradition of consumer credit regulation has strongly
favored disclosure,201 it makes no difference whether a consumer receives
reams of detailed financial guidance or a single well-drafted tip sheet if that
consumer lacks the literacy skills necessary to understand and make
beneficial use of the information. Indeed, “only 4% of Americans have
sufficient quantitative literacy skills to compare and contrast credit card
offers . . . .”202 Therefore, while acknowledging that consumer credit
education is not a “panacea” for every ill that plagues the unfortunate
199.
200.
201.
202.

Cox, supra note 147, at 479-80 (internal citations omitted).
See, e.g., Discover Bank v. Owens, 822 N.E.2d 869 (Cleveland Mun. Ct. 2004).
See Peterson, supra note 65, at 814-15.
Loonin & Renuart, supra note 5, at 197.
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relationship between elderly persons and the credit card industry,203 an
elder-specific consumer protection statute must nonetheless provide for
substantial resources to be devoted to educating elderly credit card
consumers. Such education should be accompanied by consumer research
that focuses on the unique characteristics and vulnerabilities of elderly
credit card consumers. While the two literacy studies mandated by the
Credit CARD Act are a helpful starting point,204 they should be
supplemented by ongoing consumer research of the elderly and their
relationship to the credit industry.205
4. Extensions of Credit
It is imperative that an elder-specific consumer protection statute
strengthen the mandate of § 109 of the Credit CARD Act requiring credit
card companies to consider ability to pay.206 Elderly credit card consumers
face unique financial circumstances—while most of them are guaranteed a
regular income through Social Security, retirement benefits, or pensions,
that income is often quite small, especially compared to the income enjoyed
by most elderly persons prior to retirement. The following statement of
principle from two National Consumer Law Center staff attorneys
articulates a balanced approach:
[L]enders should make loans only when they are suitable for the
consumer’s purposes and circumstances, and only after ensuring
the consumer’s ability to repay the loan from future income.
Lenders are generally in the position of understanding the shortterm and long-term costs and risks of credit to the consumer and
should be required to use that knowledge to avoid damaging the
consumer. Lenders must realistically evaluate the consumer’s
ability to afford not just the loan in question, but also all other
necessities of life.207
This approach would shift some of the risk of lending to elderly persons
back onto the lenders themselves. It should be accompanied by an
203. Id.
204. See Credit Card Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure (CARD) Act of 2009,
Pub. L. No. 111-24, §§ 510, 513, 123 Stat. 1734, 1762, 1765-66 (to be codified in scattered
sections of 15 U.S.C.).
205. See Paulsen, supra note 11, at 163 (concluding that elder-specific consumer research is
necessary in order to insure that consumer credit regulations adequately protect that age group).
206. Credit CARD Act sec. 109, § 150.
207. Loonin & Renuart, supra note 5, at 192 (internal citations omitted).
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affirmative defense that an elderly person could raise if they could not meet
their credit card obligations and were faced with a lawsuit, namely, that the
lender did not conduct a good faith ability-to-pay analysis before extending
credit to the elderly consumer. If substantive “ability to pay” regulations
were put into place and firmly enforced with respect to elderly credit card
consumers, the need for other regulatory solutions would gradually
diminish as predatory lending fell by the wayside.
C. Seeking Refuge Under Existing Law
Since the goal of this article is elder consumer protection, it would be
remiss to conclude without stating the protections and remedies available to
elderly credit card consumers under existing law. While elderly credit card
consumers should not be satisfied with the Credit CARD Act, they should
not hesitate to take full advantage of what protections it does offer.
Similarly, elderly credit card consumers, and their attorneys, should be
aware that limited remedies do exist through the courts.
Elderly credit card consumers confronting changes in terms should first
and foremost be admonished to take their time. The Credit CARD Act’s
requirement of forty-five days of notice provides some time for the elderly
person to make sure that they understand the implications of a change to
their account or to seek assistance if they do not understand.208 Also,
elderly credit card consumers should confirm with their credit card
company what date is to be the regular due date for payments and keep
track of this due date, preferably using a calendar. Because the due date
cannot be arbitrarily changed without notice, it is now possible to plan
several months in advance.209 Finally, most elderly credit card consumers
should be encouraged to opt-out of over-the-limit transactions or revoke if
they have already opted-in.210 Opting-in to over-the-limit transactions will
almost certainly remain an option and the elderly credit card consumer can
choose to opt-in at a later time in order to make a specific purchase or when
he otherwise believes it is in his best interest to do so.
Elderly credit card consumers should be educated regarding their rights
under the Credit CARD Act and encouraged to contact their credit card
company when they believe those rights have been violated. To that end,
elderly credit card consumers should also be encouraged to keep thorough
records of their dealings with their credit card company, including
statements and other mailings, telephone conversations, and so on. Even if
208. See Credit CARD Act sec. 101(a)(1), § 127(i).
209. See id. sec. 106, § 127(o).
210. See id. sec. 102(a), § 127(k).
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the elderly credit card consumer cannot put his finger on what has gone
wrong with his account, detailed records will help an attorney or financial
advisor assist the elderly credit card consumer in determining whether a
violation of the Credit CARD Act has occurred.
While judicial empathy for the plight of elderly credit card users has
been tepid at best,211 elderly credit card consumers have begun to win
limited victories using contract law theories. For example, Discover Bank
v. Owens was an important decision for elderly victims of abusive credit
card industry practices.212 The Ohio judge in that case applied several
contract doctrines including duty to mitigate damages, unjust enrichment,
and unconscionability in reaching a judgment for an elderly defendant who
could not repay her credit card debt.213 In reaching his unconscionability
holding, the judge sharply criticized Discover Bank for continuing to pile
on charges which had no connection to any value received by the
cardholder.214 Notably, Ohio’s consumer protection unconscionability
statute lists the following factor designed to protect vulnerable groups:
“[w]hether the supplier has knowingly taken advantage of the inability of
the consumer reasonably to protect his interests because of his physical or
mental infirmities, ignorance, illiteracy, or inability to understand the
language of an agreement.”215
Commentators have acknowledged that “[u]nconscionability as a remedy
for the elderly has its own limitations.”216 Nonetheless, attempts to
introduce the Discover Bank decision as persuasive authority in other
jurisdictions have been encouraged.217 Unconscionability and other
contract doctrines provide a rare opportunity—in a post-Marquette world
dominated by federal regulation and the exportation doctrine—for states to
hold lenders accountable. Other states could adopt an unconscionability
statute similar to that of Ohio, requiring judges to consider the vulnerability
of an elderly consumer when evaluating a credit card contract. Robust

211. See Robyn L. Meadows, Unconscionability as a Contract Policing Device for the
Elder Client: How Useful Is It?, 38 AKRON L. REV. 741, 758 (2005).
212. See 822 N.E.2d 869, 873-74 (Cleveland Mun. Ct. 2004); see also Harkness, supra note
5, at 14 (explaining how Discover Bank has the potential to encourage other judges to decide
credit card collection suits in favor of elderly debtors).
213. Discover Bank, 822 N.E.2d at 873-74.
214. Id. at 874.
215. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1345.03(B)(1) (West 2010).
216. Meadows, supra note 211, at 758; see also Harkness, supra note 5, at 14-15.
217. See, e.g., Harkness, supra note 5, at 30-31 (detailing efforts to introduce the Discover
Bank decision as persuasive authority in Tennessee).
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application of consumer-friendly contract statutes would contribute to
creating a safer world for elderly credit card consumers.
VII. Conclusion
For elderly credit card consumers, it is time to move beyond the
historically limited disclosure requirements of TILA and to strengthen and
expand the Credit CARD Act’s tentative steps toward substantive
protections. While substantial regulation of the credit card industry will
require a balancing of interests, Congress would do well to give more
weight to the interests of elderly consumers than to those of the credit card
industry. Until Congress acts, however, consumer advocates must remain
active in their efforts for reform and work to ensure that elderly credit card
consumers enjoy the best protections that existing law has to offer. A
consumer credit protection statute of real substance might be a rarity, but it
is a necessity.
Michael A. Furlong
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